Assume a set of objects is given with information about their bilateral relationships, allowing for incomplete and multiple comparisons as well as different preference intensities. An axiomatic approach is applied for the problem of ranking the objects. Consistency requires the preservation of relative ranking if two sets of such preferences are aggregated. Self-consistency prohibits to assign a lower rank for an object with a better or equivalent performance than another. It is revealed that these two properties cannot be satisfied simultaneously. The impossibility holds under various restrictions on the domain. However, a positive result emerges if only aggregation of ranking problems with the same comparison structure is allowed, which implies possibility in the case of round-robin tournaments.
Introduction
Consider a set of objects which should be ranked on the basis of information about their bilateral relationships. Similar problems arise, among others, in social choice theory (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998) , sports (Landau, 1895 (Landau, , 1914 Zermelo, 1929) , psychology (Thurstone, 1927) , internet search (Brin and Page, 1998; Kleinberg, 1999) , and bibliometrics (Pinski and Narin, 1976; Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2004) . We discuss a universal version of the problem involving arbitrary preference intensities as well as incomplete and multiple comparisons.
The main contribution of this paper is the presentation of an impossibility theorem: consistency -requiring that if an object is ranked at least as high as another in two independent problems, then it is ranked as high as the other in the unified problem, too -and self-consistency -a less known but intuitive property, introduced in Chebotarev and Shamis (1997) , which prohibits to assign a lower rank for an object with a better or equivalent performance than another -cannot be met simultaneously by any ranking method on the set of all problems. Domain restrictions and weakening of the properties are also investigated in order to get some positive results.
Since self-consistency is an axiom difficult to debate, we cannot demand consistency from a ranking method. At the first glance, it is a somewhat surprising and controversial result making the aggregation of (incomplete) preferences impossible. One may argue that the whole concept of paired comparisons-based ranking is flawed. However, loss of consistency may be regarded as a necessary sacrifice for dimension reduction since the outcome should be an inherently transitive ranking even from intransitive data.
This interpretation is reinforced by the connection between consistency and independence of irrelevant matches (which requires the relative ranking of two objects to be independent of the outcome of comparisons between other objects): the former, together with two basic axioms, implies the latter. And independence of irrelevant matches is known to be a property one would rather not have if different preference intensities and incomplete comparisons are allowed (González-Díaz et al., 2014; Csató, 2016) .
Our discussion is strongly related to the findings of previous axiomatic analyses (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998; González-Díaz et al., 2014) , and especially to the formulation of impossibility theorems (Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008) . For example, the central result reveals why most popular ranking methods violate a relaxed version of consistency called order preservation (González-Díaz et al., 2014) . We also connect the current impossibility theorem to a recent one (Csató, 2016) .
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the setting of the ranking problem, and recalls some ranking methods. Section 3 introduces consistency and self-consistency besides some basic properties, which are necessary to link consistency and an independence axiom. The impossibility theorem is proved and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 aims to obtain possibility results, while Section 6 summarizes our main findings.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present the ranking problem and introduce some scoring procedures, later examined from an axiomatic point of view.
The ranking problem
Consider a set of objects N = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n }, n ∈ N and a series of matrices T (1) , T (2) , . . . , T (m) containing information about pairwise comparisons between the objects. These matrices may represent the opinion of a voter/expert, the results of a round of a sport tournament, the outcome of an experiment etc. Their entries are given such that t T (p) in order to derive a ranking. t ij /(t ij + t ji ) can be interpreted as the likelihood that object X i is better than object X j (provided they have been compared, that is, t ij + t ji > 0).
The pair (N, T ) is called a ranking problem. The set of ranking problems with n objects (|N | = n) is denoted by R n . Let (N, T ), (N, T ) ∈ R n be two ranking problems with the same object set N . The sum of these ranking problems is a ranking problem, too, denoted by (N, T + T ) ∈ R n . For example, the ranking problems can contain the preferences of voters in two cities of the same country, or the paired comparisons of teams in the first and second half of the season.
A ranking problem (N, T ) has a skew-symmetric results matrix
m ij is the number of comparisons between X i and X j , whose outcome is given by r ij . Matrices R and M also determine the aggregated paired comparisons matrix by T = (R + M )/2. Any ranking problem (N, T ) ∈ R n can be denoted analogously by (N, R, M ) with the restriction |r ij | ≤ m ij for all X i , X j ∈ N . Despite description through results and matches matrices is not parsimonious, the notation (N, R, M ) will turn out to be useful.
Some meaningful subsets of R n is worth to introduce.
Definition 2.1. Special classes of ranking problems:
The first three subsets pose restrictions on the matches matrix M . In a balanced ranking problem, all objects have the same number of comparisons -a typical example is a Swiss-system tournament if the number of participants is even. In a round-robin ranking problem, the number of comparisons between any pair of objects is the same -a typical example (of double round-robin) can be the qualification for soccer tournaments like UEFA European Championship. In an unweighted ranking problem, multiple comparisons may not occur.
In an extremal ranking problem, the outcome of a comparison can only be a complete win (r ij = m ij ), a draw (r ij = 0), or a maximal loss (r ij = −m ij ), that is, preferences have no intensity, however, ties are allowed.
Notation 2.1. The set of balanced ranking problems is denoted by R B . The set of round-robin ranking problems is denoted by R R . The set of unweighted ranking problems is denoted by R U . The set of extremal ranking problems is denoted by R E .
Note that a round-robin ranking problem is balanced (R R ⊂ R B ). One can also consider any intersection of these classes.
Let (N, R, M ) ∈ R n be a ranking problem. The number of comparisons of object
The comparison multigraph is given such that its vertex set corresponds to the object set N and the number of edges between objects X i and X j is equal to m ij . The Laplacian matrix L = [ ij ] ∈ R n×n of the comparison multigraph, associated with the ranking problem, is given by ij = −m ij for all X i = X j and ii = d i for all X i ∈ N . The ranking problem is called connected or unconnected if its comparison multigraph is connected or unconnected, respectively.
Some ranking methods
A number of ranking methods has been suggested for similar problems, see Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) . Our discussion will focus on scoring procedures: the ranking of objects in N is based on a function f :
n denote the column vector with e i = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let I ∈ R n×n be the identity matrix and O ∈ R n×n be the matrix with all its entries being zero. The first scoring method simply sums up the results.
Definition 2.2. Row sum: s(N, R, M ) = Re.
A related parametric procedure has been constructed axiomatically by Chebotarev (1989) and thoroughly analysed in Chebotarev (1994) . Generalized row sum adjusts the row sum s i by taking the performance of objects compared with X i into account, and adds an infinite depth to this argument. ε indicates the importance attributed to this correction.
Generalized row sum results in row sum if ε → 0:
. On the basis of certain desirable conditions, Chebotarev (1994) identifies the reasonable upper bound of ε as 1/ [m(n − 2)].
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The row sum and generalized row sum rankings are unique and easily computable from a system of linear equations for all ranking problems (N, R, M ) ∈ R n . The least squares method was suggested by Thurstone (1927) and Horst (1932) . The least squares ranking is unique if and only if the ranking problem (N, R, M ) ∈ R n is connected (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1999, p. 220) . Ranking of unconnected objects makes no sense. The least squares ranking can be made unique if Definition 2.4 is applied for all ranking subproblems with a connected comparison multigraph. An extensive analysis and a graph interpretation of the least squares method can be found in Csató (2015) .
Axioms for ranking
In the following, some basic properties of a ranking method are presented.
Structural invariance properties
Axiom 3.1. Neutrality (N EU ) (Young, 1974) : Let (N, R, M ) ∈ R n be a ranking problem, σ : N → N be a permutation on the set of objects, and σ(N, R, M ) ∈ R n be the ranking problem obtained from (N, R, M ) by this permutation. Scoring procedure f :
Neutrality means that the ranking is independent of the labelling of the objects. This axiom has been called anonymity in some works (Bouyssou, 1992; Slutzki and Volij, 2005; González-Díaz et al., 2014) .
n be a ranking problem such that r ij = 0 for all objects
Symmetry implies that if all paired comparisons result in a draw, then all objects will be tied according to the ranking: f (N, O, M ) = κe such that κ ∈ R. Young (1974) and Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Axiom 4) have used the property cancellation for round-robin ranking problems, which coincides with symmetry on this domain. (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998) 
Inversion means that taking the opposite of all results changes the ranking accordingly. It establishes a uniform treatment of victories and losses. Chebotarev (1994, Property 7) defines transposability such that the ratings change their sign and keep the same absolute value.
The following result was already mentioned by González-Díaz et al. (2014, p. 150) . 
Additivity and independence
Axiom 3.4. Consistency (CS) (Young, 1974) : Let (N, T ), (N, T ) ∈ R n be two ranking problems and X i , X j ∈ N be two objects. Let f : R n → R n be a scoring procedure such that
CS is the most general and intuitive version of additivity: if X i is not worse than X j in two ranking problems, this should be preserved after adding them up. We have already seen that the sum of two ranking problems may have a natural interpretation. Young (1974) used this property only in the case of round-robin tournaments. The next property appears as independence in Rubinstein (1980, Axiom III) and Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Axiom 5) for round-robin ranking problems. The name independence of irrelevant matches has been used by González-Díaz et al. (2014) . It deals with the effects of certain changes in the aggregated paired comparisons matrix.
Corollary 3.3. CS and SY M imply
Axiom 3.5. Independence of irrelevant matches (IIM ): Let (N, T ), (N, T ) ∈ R n be two ranking problems and X i , X j , X k , X ∈ N be four different objects such that (N, T ) and
IIM means that 'remote' comparisons -not involving objects X i and X j -do not affect the relative ranking of X i and X j . Changing the matches matrix may result in an unconnected ranking problem. Remark 3.1. Property IIM has a meaning if n ≥ 4.
Sequential application of IIM can lead to any ranking problem (N,T ) ∈ R n wherē t gh = t gh if {X g , X h } ∩ {X i , X j } = ∅, but all other paired comparisons are arbitrary. Axiom 3.6. Self-consistency (SC) (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1997) 
Self-consistency
is an unweighted ranking problem for all p = 1, 2, . . . , m. Let X i , X j ∈ N be two objects and f : R n → R n be a scoring procedure such that for all p = 1, 2, . . . , m there exists a one-to-one mapping
if at least one of the above inequalities is strict.
According to self-consistency, if object X i is obviously not worse than object X j , then it is not ranked lower, furthermore, if it is better (has better results against opponents with the same strength, has the same results against stronger opponents, or has better results against stronger opponents), then it is ranked higher.
Self-consistency has been extensively discussed by Chebotarev and Shamis (1997) and Csató (2016 
Compatibility of the axioms
In this section two axioms, consistency and independence of irrelevant matches are related, which has an unfavourable consequence. Afterwards, our main result illustrates the impossibility of satisfying consistency and self-consistency at the same time.
Connection of additivity to independence and some implications Proposition 4.1. A scoring procedure satisfying N EU , SY M and CS meets IIM .
Proof. Assume to the contrary, and let (N, R, M ) ∈ R n be a ranking problem, f : R n → R n be a scoring procedure and X i , X j , X k , X ∈ N be four different objects such that
and (N, R , M ) ∈ R
n is identical to (N, R, M ) except for the result r k = r k and match m k = m k , where
Corollary 3.3 implies that a symmetric and consistent scoring procedure satisfies 
consistency, which is a contradiction. Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Lemma 3) have proved the same relationship on the set of round-robin ranking problems R R . However, Proposition 4.1 is not a trivial extension since the significantly more abundant domain.
Corollary 4.1. The row sum method is independent of irrelevant matches.
Proof. It follows from Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2 by Proposition 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. N EU , SY M and CS are logically independent axioms.
Proof. It is shown that there exist scoring methods, which satisfy exactly two properties from the set N EU , SY M and CS, but violate the third (and hence IIM , too):
3 N EU and SY M : aggregated row sum of all opponents, that is, 
An impossibility of preference aggregation
Lemma 4.1 suggests that the four axioms of Proposition 4.2 may be independent. It is not the case, leading to a much stronger result.
Theorem 4.1. There exists no scoring procedure that is consistent and self-consistent.
Proof. The contradiction of the two axioms is proved by an example. It is shown in Figure 1 : a directed edge from node X i to X j indicates a complete win of X i over X j (and a complete loss of X j against X i ), while an undirected edge from node X i to X j represents a draw in one comparison between the two objects. This representation will be used in further examples, too.
Assume to the contrary that there exists a scoring procedure f : R n → R n , which is consistent and self-consistent.
I. Take the ranking problem (N, R, M ). Note that O
a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences g 13 : O 1 ↔ O 3 and g 31 : O 3 ↔ O 1 such that g 13 (X 2 ) = g 31 (X 2 ) = X 2 and g 13 (X 4 ) = g 31 (X 4 ) = X 4 . Since r 12 = r 32 = 0 and r 14 = r 34 = 0, X 1 and X 3 have the same results against the same opponents, hence
b) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences g 24 : O 2 ↔ O 4 and g 42 :
Since r 21 = r 41 = 0 and r 23 = r 43 = 0, X 2 and X 4 have the same results against the same opponents, hence
Consider the one-to-one-mapping g 12 : O 1 ↔ O 2 , where g 12 (X 2 ) = X 1 and g 12 (X 4 ) = X 3 . Since r 12 = r 21 = 0 and r 14 = r 23 = 0, X 1 has the same results against stronger opponents compared to X 2 , hence
II. Take the ranking problem (N, R , M ). Note that O
a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences g 12 : O 1 ↔ O 2 and g 21 : O 2 ↔ O 1 . Since r 13 = r 23 = −1 and r 14 = r 24 = 0, X 1 and X 2 have the same results against the same opponents, hence
b) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondence g 34 : O 3 ↔ O 4 . Since 1 = r 31 > r 41 = 0 and 1 = r 32 > r 42 = 0, X 3 has better results against the same opponents compared to X 4 , hence
Hence, self-consistency leads to
III. Take the ranking problem (N, R , M ) ∈ R 4 B with the decomposition R = R + R and M = M + M (see Figure 2) . Consistency results in (N, R , M ) . Consider the one-to-one mappings
Since r 21 = r 12 = 0, r 23 = r 14 = 0 and r 23 = r 13 = −1, r 24 = r 14 = 0, X 2 has the same results against stronger opponents compared to X 1 , hence f 2 (N, R, M ) > f 1 (N, R, M ) from SC, which is a contradiction.
To summarize, self-consistency leads to f 1 (N, R , M ) < f 2 (N, R , M ) in the aggregated ranking problem (N, R , M ), contrary to the above implication of consistency. 
It has been derived that no scoring procedure can meet CS and SC simultaneously on the universal domain. Theorem 4.1 is a serious impossibility result: by accepting self-consistency, one cannot require the ranking method to be additive in the most general sense.
The comparison of Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1 suggests that self-consistency may imply neutrality or symmetry. However, it is not true as the following result shows.
Lemma 4.2. There exists a scoring method that is self-consistent, but not neutral and symmetric.
Proof. The statement can be verified by an example where an SC-compatible ranking contradicts to N EU and SY M . 
E be the ranking problem in Figure 3 . Consider the ranking 1 such that X 1 1 X 2 1 X 3 1 X 4 . It meets self-consistency since X 1 has the same result against a stronger opponent compared to X 4 , while there exists no correspondence between opponent sets O 2 and O 3 satisfying the conditions required by SC.
Let σ : N → N be a permutation such that σ(X 1 ) = X 4 , σ(X 2 ) = X 3 , σ(X 3 ) = X 2 , and σ(X 4 ) = X 1 . It implies σ(N, R, M ) = (N, R, M ), so N EU results in X 1 ∼ X 4 and X 2 ∼ X 3 . Furthermore, SY M leads to X 1 ∼ X 2 ∼ X 3 ∼ X 4 as all results are draws. However, both conditions are violated by the ranking 1 .
Relaxing generality
Impossibility results, like the one in Theorem 4.1, can be rectified in two ways: by restrictions on the class of ranking problems considered, or by the weakening of axioms.
Domain restrictions
Besides the natural subclasses of ranking problems introduced in Definition 2.1, the number of objects can be limited, too.
Lemma 5.1. The row sum method is consistent and self-consistent on the set of ranking problems with at most three objects R n |n ≤ 3.
Proof. The case n = 2 is trivial.
U is an unweighted ranking problem for all p = 1, 2, . . . , m. Let X i , X j ∈ N be two objects and assume that for all p = 1, 2, . . . , m there exists a one-to-one mapping
Obviously,
Due to the existence of one-to-one mappings,
, so all inequalities hold as equality, hence SC is satisfied.
Lemma 5.1 has some meaning since the ranking is not trivial if n = 3. However, if four objects are allowed, the situation becomes more severe. Proof. Due to the axioms agreement (Chebotarev, 1994, Property 3) and score consistency (González-Díaz et al., 2014) , generalized row sum and least squares methods coincide with row sum on the set of R R , so Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3 provide IIM and SC, respectively.
Consistency is a property easy to use in axiomatizations, which may be the reason that most characterizations of the row sum method were suggested on this -or even more restricted -domain (Young, 1974; Hansson and Sahlquist, 1976; Rubinstein, 1980; Nitzan and Rubinstein, 1981; Henriet, 1985; Bouyssou, 1992) . Consequently, generalized row sum method is advised to apply with a parameter inversely proportional to the number of comparisons. The impossibility holds under various restrictions, including the cases when all objects have the same number of comparisons, or all preferences are extreme (Lemma 5.2). The size of the problem does not solve the issue as it emerges with at least four objects (Lemmata 5.1 and 5.2). On the other hand, round-robin ranking problems can be aggregated without similar difficulties (Proposition 5.1).
Weakening of additivity
A plausible weakening of self-consistency is satisfied by the row sum method besides consistency (Proposition 5.3), but this modification has not much significance. Consistency can be restricted by requiring additivity only for ranking problems with the same comparisons structure, called result consistency. The new property is satisfied by the least squares and an appropriately parametrized version of the generalized row sum methods, and the implied possibility theorem (Proposition 5.2) turns out to be more general than the one derived in the round-robin case (consider Corollary 5.5).
The current study has not lead to any obvious characterization since Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 allow for more than one ranking methods (Proposition 5.3 requires further investigation). For example, the difference of generalized row sum with ε = 1/ [m(n − 2)] and least squares methods is not revealed by the properties analysed here. Axiomatic construction of scoring procedures seems to be an obvious continuation of this research, however, losing consistency certainly does not simplify the challenge.
